Questions for Review

1. First, Keynes conjectured that the marginal propensity to consume—the amount consumed out of an additional dollar of income—is between zero and one. This means that if an individual’s income increases by a dollar, both consumption and saving increase.

   Second, Keynes conjectured that the ratio of consumption to income—called the average propensity to consume—falls as income rises. This implies that the rich save a higher proportion of their income than do the poor.

   Third, Keynes conjectured that income is the primary determinant of consumption. In particular, he believed that the interest rate does not have an important effect on consumption.

   A consumption function that satisfies these three conjectures is

   \[ C = \bar{C} + cY. \]

   \( \bar{C} \) is a constant level of “autonomous consumption,” and \( Y \) is disposable income; \( c \) is the marginal propensity to consume, and is between zero and one.

2. The evidence that was consistent with Keynes’s conjectures came from studies of household data and short time-series. There were two observations from household data. First, households with higher income consumed more and saved more, implying that the marginal propensity to consume is between zero and one. Second, higher-income households saved a larger fraction of their income than lower-income households, implying that the average propensity to consume falls with income.

   There were three additional observations from short time-series. First, in years when aggregate income was low, both consumption and saving were low, implying that the marginal propensity to consume is between zero and one. Second, in years with low income, the ratio of consumption to income was high, implying that the average propensity to consume falls as income rises. Third, the correlation between income and consumption seemed so strong that no variables other than income seemed important in explaining consumption.

   The first piece of evidence against Keynes’s three conjectures came from the failure of “secular stagnation” to occur after World War II. Based on the Keynesian consumption function, some economists expected that as income increased over time, the saving rate would also increase; they feared that there might not be enough profitable investment projects to absorb this saving, and the economy might enter a long depression of indefinite duration. This did not happen.

   The second piece of evidence against Keynes’s conjectures came from studies of long time-series of consumption and income. Simon Kuznets found that the ratio of consumption to income was stable from decade to decade; that is, the average propensity to consume did not seem to be falling over time as income increased.

3. Both the life-cycle and permanent-income hypotheses emphasize that an individual’s time horizon is longer than a single year. Thus, consumption is not simply a function of current income.

   The life-cycle hypothesis stresses that income varies over a person’s life; saving allows consumers to move income from those times in life when income is high to those times when it is low. The life-cycle hypothesis predicts that consumption should depend on both wealth and income, since these determine a person’s lifetime resources. Hence, we expect the consumption function to look like

   \[ C = \alpha W + \beta Y. \]
In the short run, with wealth fixed, we get a “conventional” Keynesian consumption function. In the long run, wealth increases, so the short-run consumption function shifts upward, as shown in Figure 16–1.

The permanent-income hypothesis also implies that people try to smooth consumption, though its emphasis is slightly different. Rather than focusing on the pattern of income over a lifetime, the permanent-income hypothesis emphasizes that people experience random and temporary changes in their income from year to year. The permanent-income hypothesis views current income as the sum of permanent income $Y^p$ and transitory income $Y^t$. Milton Friedman hypothesized that consumption should depend primarily on permanent income:

$$C = \alpha Y^p.$$  

The permanent-income hypothesis explains the consumption puzzle by suggesting that the standard Keynesian consumption function uses the wrong variable for income. For example, if a household has high transitory income, it will not have higher consumption; hence, if much of the variability in income is transitory, a researcher would find that high-income households had, on average, a lower average propensity to consume. This is also true in short time-series if much of the year-to-year variation in income is transitory. In long time-series, however, variations in income are largely permanent; therefore, consumers do not save any increases in income, but consume them instead.
4. Fisher’s model of consumption looks at how a consumer who lives two periods will make consumption choices in order to be as well off as possible. Figure 16–2(A) shows the effect of an increase in second-period income if the consumer does not face a binding borrowing constraint. The budget constraint shifts outward, and the consumer increases consumption in both the first and the second period.

Figure 16–2(A)

Figure 16–2(B) shows what happens if there is a binding borrowing constraint. The consumer would like to borrow to increase first-period consumption but cannot. If income increases in the second period, the consumer is unable to increase first-period consumption. Therefore, the consumer continues to consume his or her entire income in each period. That is, for those consumers who would like to borrow but cannot, consumption depends only on current income.

Figure 16–2(B)
5. The permanent-income hypothesis implies that consumers try to smooth consumption over time, so that current consumption is based on current expectations about lifetime income. It follows that changes in consumption reflect “surprises” about lifetime income. If consumers have rational expectations, then these surprises are unpredictable. Hence, consumption changes are also unpredictable.

6. Section 16.6 included several examples of time-inconsistent behavior, in which consumers alter their decisions simply because time passes. For example, a person may legitimately want to lose weight, but decide to eat a large dinner today and eat a small dinner tomorrow and thereafter. But the next day, they may once again make the same choice—eating a large dinner that day while promising to eat less on following days.

**Problems and Applications**

1. Figure 16–3 shows the effect of an increase in the interest rate on a consumer who borrows in the first period. The increase in the real interest rate causes the budget line to rotate around the point \((Y_1, Y_2)\), becoming steeper.

   ![Figure 16–3](image)

   We can break the effect on consumption from this change into an income and substitution effect. The income effect is the change in consumption that results from the movement to a different indifference curve. Because the consumer is a borrower, the increase in the interest rate makes the consumer worse off—that is, he or she cannot achieve as high an indifference curve. If consumption in each period is a normal good, this tends to reduce both \(C_1\) and \(C_2\).

   The substitution effect is the change in consumption that results from the change in the relative price of consumption in the two periods. The increase in the interest rate makes second-period consumption relatively less expensive; this tends to make the consumer choose more consumption in the second period and less consumption in the first period.

   On net, we find that for a borrower, first-period consumption falls unambiguously when the real interest rate rises, since both the income and substitution effects push in the same direction. Second-period consumption might rise or fall, depending on which
effect is stronger. In Figure 16–3, we show the case in which the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect, so that $C_2$ increases.

2. a. We can use Jill’s intertemporal budget constraint to solve for the interest rate:

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} = Y_1 + \frac{Y_2}{1+r}$$

$$\frac{100}{1+r} = \frac{210}{1+r}$$

$$r = 10\%.$$  

Jill borrowed $100 for consumption in the first period and in the second period used her $210 income to pay $110 on the loan (principal plus interest) and $100 for consumption.

b. The rise in interest rates leads Jack to consume less today and more tomorrow. This is because of the substitution effect: it costs him more to consume today than tomorrow, because of the higher opportunity cost in terms of forgone interest. This is shown in Figure 16–4.

![Figure 16–4](image)

By revealed preference we know Jack is better off: at the new interest rate he could still consume $100 in each period, so the only reason he would change his consumption pattern is if the change makes him better off.
c. Jill consumes less today, while her consumption tomorrow can either rise or fall. She faces both a substitution effect and income effect. Because consumption today is more expensive, she substitutes out of it. Also, since all her income is in the second period, the higher interest rate raises her cost of borrowing and, thus, lowers her income. Assuming consumption in period one is a normal good, this provides an additional incentive for lowering it. Her new consumption choice is at point B in Figure 16–5.

![Figure 16–5](image)

We know Jill is worse off with the higher interest rates because she could have consumed at point B before (by not spending all of her second-period money) but chose not to because point A had higher utility.

3. a. A consumer who consumes less than his income in period one is a saver and faces an interest rate \( r_s \). His budget constraint is

\[
C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1 + r_s} < Y_1 + \frac{Y_2}{1 + r_s}.
\]

b. A consumer who consumes more than income in period one is a borrower and faces an interest rate \( r_b \). The budget constraint is

\[
C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1 + r_b} < Y_1 + \frac{Y_2}{1 + r_b}.
\]
c. Figure 16–6 shows the two budget constraints; they intersect at the point \((Y_1, Y_2)\), where the consumer is neither a borrower nor a lender. The shaded area represents the combinations of first-period and second-period consumption that the consumer can choose. To the left of the point \((Y_1, Y_2)\), the interest rate is \(r_b\).

![Figure 16–6](image)

d. Figure 16–7 shows the three cases. Figure 16–7(A) shows the case of a saver for whom the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint along the line segment to the left of \((Y_1, Y_2)\). Figure 16–7(B) shows the case of a borrower for whom the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint along the line segment to the right of \((Y_1, Y_2)\). Finally, Figure 16–7(C) shows the case in which the consumer is neither a borrower nor a lender: the highest indifference curve the consumer can reach is the one that passes through the point \((Y_1, Y_2)\).
Second-period consumption

First-period consumption

Figure 16–7A

Figure 16–7B

Figure 16–7C
e. If the consumer is a saver, then consumption in the first period depends on \( Y_1 + \frac{Y_2}{1 + r_s} \)—that is, income in both periods, \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \), and the interest rate \( r_s \). If the consumer is a borrower, then consumption in the first period depends on \( Y_1 + \frac{Y_2}{1 + r_b} \)—that is, income in both periods, \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \), and the interest rate \( r_b \). Note that borrowers discount future income more than savers.

If the consumer is neither a borrower nor a lender, then consumption in the first period depends just on \( Y_1 \).

4. The potency of fiscal policy to influence aggregate demand depends on the effect on consumption: if consumption changes a lot, then fiscal policy will have a large multiplier. If consumption changes only a little, then fiscal policy will have a small multiplier. That is, the fiscal-policy multipliers are higher if the marginal propensity to consume is higher.

a. Consider a two-period Fisher diagram. A temporary tax cut means an increase in first-period disposable income \( Y_1 \). Figure 16–8(A) shows the effect of this tax cut on a consumer who does not face a binding borrowing constraint, whereas Figure 16–8(B) shows the effect of this tax cut on a consumer who is constrained.

The consumer with the constraint would have liked to get a loan to increase \( C_1 \), but could not. The temporary tax cut increases disposable income: as shown in the figure, the consumer’s consumption rises by the full amount that taxes fall. The consumer who is constrained thus increases first-period consumption \( C_1 \) by more
than the consumer who is not constrained—that is, the marginal propensity to consume is higher for a consumer who faces a borrowing constraint. Therefore, fiscal policy is more potent with binding borrowing constraints than it is without them.

b. Again, consider a two-period Fisher diagram. The announcement of a future tax cut increases $Y_2$. Figure 16–9(A) shows the effect of this tax cut on a consumer who does not face a binding borrowing constraint, whereas Figure 16–9(B) shows the effect of this tax cut on a consumer who is constrained.

The consumer who is not constrained immediately increases consumption $C_1$. The consumer who is constrained cannot increase $C_1$, because disposable income has not changed. Therefore, the announcement of a future tax cut has no effect on consumption or aggregate demand if consumers face binding borrowing constraints: fiscal policy is less potent.

5. In this question, we look at how income growth affects the pattern of consumption and wealth accumulation over a person’s lifetime. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate is zero and that the consumer wants as smooth a consumption path as possible.

a. Figure 16–10 shows the case in which the consumer can borrow. Income increases during the consumer’s lifetime until retirement, when it falls to zero.
Desired consumption is level over the lifetime. Until year $T_1$, consumption is greater than income, so the consumer borrows. After $T_1$, consumption is less than income, so the consumer saves. This means that until $T_1$, wealth is negative and falling. After $T_1$, wealth begins to increase; after $T_2$, all borrowing is repaid, so wealth becomes positive. Wealth accumulation continues until retirement, when the consumer dissaves all wealth to finance consumption.

b. Figure 16–11 shows the case in which a borrowing constraint prevents the consumer from having negative wealth. Before $T_1'$, the consumer would like to be borrowing, as in part (a), but cannot. Therefore, income is consumed and is neither saved nor borrowed. After $T_1'$, the consumer begins to save for retirement, and lifetime consumption remains constant at $C'$. 
Note that $C'$ is greater than $C$, and $T_{1}'$ is greater than $T_{1}$, as shown. This is because in part (b), the consumer has lower consumption in the first part of life, so there are more resources left when there is no constraint—consumption will be higher.

6. The life-cycle model predicts that an important source of saving is that people save while they work to finance consumption after they retire. That is, the young save, and the old dissave. If the fraction of the population that is elderly will increase over the next 20 years, the life-cycle model predicts that as these elderly retire, they will begin to dissave their accumulated wealth in order to finance their retirement consumption; thus, the national saving rate should fall over the next 20 years.

7. In this chapter, we discussed two explanations for why the elderly do not dissave as rapidly as the life-cycle model predicts. First, because of the possibility of unpredictable and costly events, they may keep some precautionary saving as a buffer in case they live longer than expected or have large medical bills. Second, they may want to leave bequests to their children, relatives, or charities, so again, they do not dissave all of their wealth during retirement.

If the elderly who do not have children dissave at the same rate as the elderly who do have children, this seems to imply that the reason for low dissaving is the precautionary motive; the bequest motive is presumably stronger for people who have children than for those who don’t.

An alternative interpretation is that perhaps having children does not increase desired saving. For example, having children raises the bequest motive, but it may also lower the precautionary motive: you can rely on your children in case of financial emergency. Perhaps the two effects on saving cancel each other.

8. If you are a fully rational and time-consistent consumer, you would certainly prefer the saving account that lets you take the money out on demand. After all, you get the same return on that account, but in unexpected circumstances (e.g., if you suffer an unexpected, temporary decline in income), you can use the funds in the account to finance your consumption. This is the kind of consumer in the intertemporal models of Irving Fisher, Franco Modigliani, and Milton Friedman.

By contrast, if you face the “pull of instant gratification,” you may prefer the account that requires a 30-day notification before withdrawals. In this way, you precommit yourself to not using the funds to satisfy a desire for instant gratification. This precommitment offers a way to overcome the time-inconsistency problem. That is, some people would like to save more, but at any particular moment, they face such a strong desire for instant gratification that they always choose to consume rather than save. This is the type of consumer in David Laibson’s theory.