Econ 912: Advanced Topics in Microeconomics
(Thursday
10:00 a.m. -- 1:00 p.m., Room:TBA), Winter 2012.
Instructor:
Sumon
Majumdar Office
Hours:
Dunning
Hall, Room 318 Tuesday 3:00 –
4:00 pm
Dept.
of Economics,
Queen’s University. Thursday 3:00 - 4:00 pm
Tel:
533-2274
E-mail: sumon@econ.queensu.ca
Course web-site: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/sumon/econ912_w2012.htm
Overview:
Topics in Political Economy
This course is an exploration of topics in political economy --- the effects of political forces on economic outcomes. This area of economics, though quite old, has seen rather rapid expansion in interest and volume of knowledge in the past two decades. We will begin with an overview of some of the basic models used in the area. Following that, we will focus on some particular areas of current research interest. The coverage will attempt to be rather wide in order to expose the student to a large number of issues in the general area of political economy, with the hope that he/she can identify a topic that will be of further research interest to him/her.
The
topics and reading-list given below is preliminary and departures from it are
quite likely.
Grading
scheme and Requirements:
Students will have to write a referee report, a term paper and do a presentation for the course.
The referee report can be on any recent unpublished (so far) paper in the broad area of political economy. Please discuss with me before finalizing the paper on which you plan to write your report.
The term paper
can be on any topic in the area of political economy, quite broadly speaking.
Originality in idea and/or execution will be well-rewarded. Although I
recognize that one may not be able to complete a full-length paper within the
time-frame, one will be expected to provide the background to the topic, its
importance, and some critical analysis including at least some preliminary
findings and some expected future findings.
I will announce in class dues dates for a proposal, a first draft and a
final version.
Some of the papers I will discuss in class will have empirical sections or other papers empirically testing the predictions or providing background for the motivation. Students will be asked to pick one such paper and present it to the class. I will point out opportunities for presentation as we go along.
The weighting of the various components for the final grade will be:
Term-paper
(proposal + final version): 70%
Referee
report : 15% Presentation:
10% Class
Participation: 5%
Course Outline (preliminary; will evolve
as we go along):
A
quick overview: Besley, Tim (2004) "The New Political
Economy". Keynes Lecture in economics. Proceedings of The
British Academy.
I.
Work-horse models of politics and some of their applications
Persson,
Torsten and Guido Tabellini.
(2000) Political Economics: Explaining
Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT
Press. (chapters 3, 4 and 5).
Downsian models:
Downs, Anthony (1957) An
Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Martin J. Osborne (1995): "Spatial Models of Political
Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number
of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of
Economics 27, 261–301.
Persson,
Torsten and Guido Tabellini.
(1997) "Is Inequality harmful
for Growth?" American
Economic Review 84, pp. 600-621.
Probabilistic
voting models:
Baron, David (1994) "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters"
American Political Science Review Vol. 88, pp. 33-47.
Agency models:
Barro, Robert (1973) "The Control of Politicians: An
Economic model." Public Choice Vol. 14, pp. 19-42.
Ferejohn, J. (1986) "Incumbent Performance
and Electoral Control." Public
Choice Vol. 50, pp. 5-26.
Alberto Alesina, Filipe Campante and Guido Tabellini (2008) "Why is Fiscal Policy So Often Procyclical?" Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 6 No. 5, 1006-1036.
Persson,
Torsten and Guido Tabellini.
(2002) "Do Electoral Cycles
Differ Across Political Systems?" IGIER Working Paper, Universita Bocconi .
Career-concern
models:
Mani, Anandi, Sumon Majumdar and Sharun Mukand (2004) "Politics, Information
and the Urban Bias." Journal
of Development Economis
75, pp. 137-165.
Besley, Tim and Anne Case (1995) “Does Electoral Accountability
Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), 769-798.
Signaling
models:
Coate, Stephen and
Stephen Morris. (1995) "On the Form of Transfers
to Special Interests." Journal of Political Economy
103:1210-35.
Cukierman,
Alex and Mariano Tommasi (1998) "When Does it take a
Nixon to go to China?" American Economic Review Vol. 88
No. 1, pp. 180 - 97.
Majumdar, Sumon and Sharun
Mukand (2004) "Policy Gambles." American
Economic Review Vol. 94 No. 4, pp. 1207-22.
Partisan
Politics:
Osborne, Martin and Al Slivinski
(1996) “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1), 65 - 96.
Besley, Tim and Stephen Coate
(1997) "An Economic Model of representative Democracy"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1), 769-798.
Glaeser, Edward, G. Ponzetto
and J. Shapiro (2005): “Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on
Religious Values,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4):
1283 - 1330.
Wittman, Donald (1989) "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results" Journal
of Political Economy 97(6): 1395 -
1424.
"Theories of "Bad Policy." Policy Reform 1: 1-46.
II.
Beliefs, Culture and Politics
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole
(2006) "Belief in a Just World
and Redistributive Politics,", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(2): 699-746.
Edward Glaeser
(2005): “The Political Economy of
Hatred,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): 45 - 86.
Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) "Good Bye Lenin (or not?) - The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences," American Economic Review, 97: 1507-1528.
Tabellini, Guido (2008) . "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and
Incentives," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 123 (3): 905-950.
III.
Politics and Institutional Changes
Acemoglu, D. (2003) "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics." Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, pp. 620-652.
Acemoglu, D. "A Theory of Political
Transitions." American Economic Review Vol. 91,
no. 4, pp. 938-963.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and J.
Robinson (2001), "The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American
Economic Review 91, 1369--1401.
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2008),
“Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,” American Economic Review Vol. 98 No. 1, pp. 267--293.
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2008),
“Political Losers as a Barrier to Development,” American Economic Review Vol. 90(2), pp. 126--130.
Padro i Miquel, Gerard (2007), "The Control of Politicians in Divided
Societies: The Politics of Fear." Review of Economic Studies 74(4): 1259-1274.
Persson,
Torsten and Guido Tabellini
(2009) "Democractic
capital: The nexus of political and economic change." American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1, 88-126.
Jain,
Sanjay, Sumon Majumdar and Sharun Mukand (2011) , “Walk the Line: Conflict,
State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform” QED Working Paper 1288.
IV.
State Capacity
Tim Besley and Torsten Persson (2009): "The Origins of State Capacity:
Property Rights, Taxation and Politics," American Economic
Review, 99(4), 1218-44.
Tim Besley and Torsten Persson (2010): "State Capacity, Conflict and
Development," Econometrica,
78, 1-34.
Robinson,
James, Ragnar Torvik,
Thierry Verdier (2006) “Political foundations of the
resource curse ,” Journal of Development Economics , Vol. 79,
447-468.
V. Hatred and Conflict
Edward Glaeser (2005): “The Political Economy of
Hatred,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): 45 - 86.
Joan Esteban and Debraj
Ray (2008): "On the Salience of Ethnic
Conflict", American Economic Review, 98(5), 2185-2202.
Sandeep Baliga, David Lucca
and Tomas Sjöström (2011): "Domestic
Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?",
Review of Economic Studies, 78(2), 458-486.
Matthew Jackson and Massimo Morelli (2007): "Political Bias and War",
American Economic Review, 97: 1353-1373.
VI.
Comparative Political Systems
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini.
(1999) "The
size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational
politicians", 1998 Marshall Lecture, in European Economic Review 43,
699-735,
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini.
(2004) "Constitutional
rules and fiscal policy outcomes" American Economic Review
94, 25-46.
Maskin,
Eric and Jean Tirole. (2004) "The Politician
and The Judge: Accountability in Government", American Economic Review,
vol. 94, n. 4, p. 1034-1054.
Alesina,
Alberto and Guido Tabellini. (2007) "Bureaucrats or
Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American
Economic Review, 97: 169-79.
Academic Integrity:
Academic integrity
is constituted by the five core fundamental values of honesty, trust, fairness,
respect and responsibility (see www.academicintegrity.org).
These values are central to the building, nurturing and sustaining of an
academic community in which all members will thrive. Adherence to the values
expressed through academic integrity forms a foundation for the "freedom
of inquiry and exchange of ideas" essential to the intellectual life of
the University.
Students are
responsible for familiarizing themselves with the regulations concerning
academic integrity and for ensuring that their assignments conform to the
principles of academic integrity. Information
on academic integrity is available in the Arts and Science Calendar (Academic Regulation 1),
on the Arts and Science website (see
http://www.queensu.ca/calendars/artsci/pg4.html), and from the instructor of
this course.
Departures from
academic integrity include plagiarism, use of unauthorized materials,
facilitation, forgery and falsification, and are antithetical to the
development of an academic community at Queen's. Given the seriousness of these matters,
actions which contravene the regulation on academic integrity carry sanctions
that can range from a warning or the loss of grades on an assignment to the
failure of a course to a requirement to withdraw from the university.
Copyright:
This material is copyrighted and is for the sole use of students registered
in Econ 912. This material shall not be distributed or disseminated to anyone
other than students registered in Econ 912. Failure to abide by these
conditions is a breach of copyright, and may also constitute a breach of
academic integrity under the University Senate’s Academic Integrity Policy
Statement.