Department of Economics
Queen's University

ECON 435: Topics in Development Economics

Fall Term, 2007


Course Outline

Course Description:
The objective of ECON435 is to study, in detail, topics in development economics that have fueled significant recent debate and which have generated a substantial academic literature. This year's course will focus on two broad topics: (1) credit markets and the economics of microfinance and (2) the economics of institutional and political factors in development. In the course we will discuss both theoretical and empirical aspects of these topics and this will involve applications of elementary game theory and basic econometrics. Students are expected to participate in class discussion, complete assignments in a timely manner and complete a term paper which must be presented at the end of the term.


Grading:
There will be a term paper, 4 assignments and a presentation. The marks will be allocated according to the following grading scheme:

Texts: There are two required texts for this course:
The Economics of Microfinance by Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch
(MIT Press, 2005).
Scarcity, Conflicts and Cooperation by Pranab Bardhan (MIT Press, 2005).

We will also be discussing some of the articles listed below as well as some chapters from the following texts:
Development Economics by Debraj Ray (1998: Princeton University Press),

The Elusive Quest for Growth by William Easterley (MIT Press, 2001)

     Schedule and Readings

You should try to read the relevant chapters from the main text before class. Depending on time constraints, we will cover some of the articles in more detail than others. I will indicate which ones we will focus on as the course proceeds.


0. Technical Review (Game Theory and Econometrics)
Ray, pp. 757-804

Part I:  Informal Credit Markets and Microfinance

1. Credit Market Problems in Developing Countries
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, chs. 1 and 2
Ray ch. 14 (review)
"Credit Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory" by Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray (2000)  in A Reader in Development Economics, London: Blackwell.

2. ROSCAs and Credit Cooperatives
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 3
"The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," by Besley, Coate and Loury (1993),  American Economic Review, vol. 83, pp. 792-810.
"Thy neighbour's keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test," by Abhijit Banerjee,Timothy Besley and Timothy Guinnane (1994), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117 (3): pp. 983-995.

3. Group Lending and Enforcement
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, chs. 4 and 5
"Screening by the Company you keep: Joint Liability lending and the peer selection effect" by Maitreesh Ghatak (2000), Economic Journal, vol. 110, pp. 601-631.
"Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral," by Besley and Coate (1995), Journal of Development Economics, vol. 46, pp. 1-18.
"Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," X. Gine and D. Karlan (2006), Working Paper.

4. Savings and Insurance
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 6
"The Economics of ROSCAs and intra-household allocation," by Siwan Anderson and Jean-Marie Baland (2002), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117 (3): pp. 983-995.
"Reducing vulnerability: The demand for microinsurance," by Monique Cohen and Jennefer Sebstad (2003), MicroSave-Africa Report, March.
Ray, ch. 15

5. Economic and Social Impacts
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 7 and 8
"Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence using panel data from Bangladesh," by Shahidur Khandker (2005), The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 19 (2), pp. 263-286.
"Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much?" by Brett Coleman (2006), World Development, vol. 34 (9), pp. 1612-38.

6. The Future of Microfinance Institutions
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 9 and 10
Economist Survey on Microcredit
"Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," by Jonathan Conning (1999), Journal of Development Economics, vol. 60, pp. 51-77.
"Incentives between firms (and within)," by Robert Gibbons (2005), Management Science, Vol. 51, (1), pp. 2–17

Part II: Institutional and Political Economics of Development

7. Geography, History and Institutions
Bardhan, chs. 1 and 2
"Why do some Countries Produce so much more Output per Worker than Others?" by Hall and Jones (1999), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114 (1), pp.  83-116.
"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," by D. Acemoglu, J. Robinson and S. Johnson (2001), American Economic Review
"Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," by Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, 2002.
"Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income," Jeffrey Sachs (2003), NBER Working Paper 9490.
"Do Institutions Cause Growth?", by Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), NBER Working Paper 10568.
"The Curse of Natural Resources" by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (2001), European Economic Review, vol. 45, pp. 827-838.
"Institutions and the Resource Curse" by Mehlem, Moene and Torvik (2006), Economic Journal, vol. 116, pp. 1-20.
"Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria" by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), NBER Working Paper 9804

8. Power, Politics and Commitment

Bardhan, chs. 3 and 4
"Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2000), American Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 126-130.
"Power Struggles and the Natural Resource Curse," F. Caselli (2006), MIT Working Paper

9. Corruption
Bardhan ch. 8
"Corruption and Growth" ch. 12 of Easterly, p. 241-252
"Corruption" by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, pp. 599-617.
"Red Tape and Corruption", by Sergei Guriev (2004), Journal of Development Economics, vol. 73, pp. 489-504.

10. Growth Models
"A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, pp. 407-437.
"Is Growth Exogenous?: Taking Mankiw, Romer and Weil Seriously," by Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), NBER Working Paper #836
"R&D-based endogenous growth", ch. 10 of Introducing Advanced Macroeconomics by Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen.

11. Ethnic Conflict
Bardhan, ch. 9
"Polarized Peoples" ch. 13 of Easterly, pp. 255-281
"On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict" by F. Caselli and W. Coleman, CEP Discussion Paper 732, July 2006.