You should try to read the relevant
chapters from the main text before class. Depending on time
constraints, we will cover some of the articles in more detail than
others. I will indicate which ones we will focus on as the course
proceeds.
0.
Technical Review (Game Theory and Econometrics)
Ray, pp. 757-804
Part I: Informal Credit Markets and Microfinance
1. Credit Market Problems in
Developing Countries
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, chs. 1 and 2
Ray ch. 14 (review)
"Credit
Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory" by Ghosh, Mookherjee and
Ray (2000) in A Reader in
Development Economics,
London: Blackwell.
2. ROSCAs and Credit
Cooperatives
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 3
"The
Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations," by Besley, Coate and Loury (1993),
American Economic
Review, vol.
83, pp. 792-810.
"Thy neighbour's keeper:
The design of a credit cooperative with theory
and a test," by Abhijit Banerjee,Timothy Besley and Timothy
Guinnane
(1994),
Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 117 (3): pp. 983-995.
3. Group Lending and Enforcement
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, chs. 4 and 5
"Screening by the Company
you keep:
Joint Liability lending and the peer selection effect" by Maitreesh
Ghatak (2000),
Economic Journal,
vol. 110, pp. 601-631.
"Group
Lending, Repayment Incentives and
Social Collateral," by Besley and Coate (1995),
Journal of
Development
Economics,
vol. 46, pp. 1-18.
"Group
versus
Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," X.
Gine
and D. Karlan (2006), Working Paper.
4. Savings and Insurance
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 6
"The Economics of
ROSCAs and intra-household allocation," by Siwan
Anderson and Jean-Marie Baland (2002),
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 117 (3): pp. 983-995.
"Reducing vulnerability:
The demand for microinsurance," by Monique
Cohen and Jennefer Sebstad (2003), MicroSave-Africa Report, March.
Ray, ch. 15
5. Economic and Social Impacts
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 7 and 8
"Microfinance and
Poverty: Evidence using panel data from Bangladesh,"
by Shahidur Khandker (2005),
The
World Bank Economic Review, vol. 19 (2), pp. 263-286.
"Microfinance in
Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much?" by
Brett Coleman (2006), World Development, vol. 34 (9), pp. 1612-38.
6. The Future of Microfinance
Institutions
Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch, ch. 9 and 10
Economist Survey on
Microcredit
"Outreach, sustainability
and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored
lending," by Jonathan Conning (1999),
Journal
of Development Economics, vol. 60, pp. 51-77.
"Incentives between firms
(and within)," by Robert Gibbons (2005),
Management Science, Vol. 51, (1),
pp. 2–17
Part II: Institutional and Political Economics of Development
7. Geography, History and Institutions
Bardhan, chs. 1 and 2
"Why
do some Countries Produce so much more Output per Worker than Others?"
by Hall and Jones (1999),
Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 114 (1), pp. 83-116.
"The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation," by D.
Acemoglu, J. Robinson and S. Johnson (2001),
American
Economic Review
"Institutions
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in
Economic
Development,"
by Dani Rodrik, Arvind
Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, 2002.
"Institutions Don't
Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income," Jeffrey
Sachs (2003), NBER Working Paper 9490.
"Do
Institutions Cause Growth?", by Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta,
Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), NBER Working Paper 10568.
"The
Curse of Natural Resources" by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner
(2001),
European Economic Review,
vol. 45, pp. 827-838.
"Institutions
and the Resource Curse" by Mehlem, Moene and Torvik (2006),
Economic Journal, vol. 116, pp.
1-20.
"Addressing
the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria" by
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), NBER Working Paper 9804