## **Pollution Exporting Example**

Assume global market for dirty goods is in equilibrium  $\Rightarrow$  global QD = global QS

- @ t=0 ⇒ global QD = global QS = 100 ⇒ OECD QD = 50
  - $\Rightarrow \text{OECD } QS = 50$  $\Rightarrow \text{non-OECD } QD = 50$
  - $\Rightarrow$  non-OECD Qs = 50

 $\therefore$  OECD responsible for 50% of global demand and 50% of global supply at t=0. & non-OECD responsible for 50% global demand and 50% global supply at t=0.

- @ t=1  $\Rightarrow$  increased specialization due to trade has resulted in OECD shifting production out of dirty goods and into clean goods
  - $\Rightarrow$  simultaneously demand for dirty goods has also fallen in OECD nations (due to income growth resulting from increased trade)
  - $\Rightarrow$  OECD Qs = 40 ( $\Rightarrow$  20% reduction in dirty goods production)
  - $\Rightarrow$  OECD QD = 25 ( $\Rightarrow$  50% reduction in dirty goods demand)
  - $\Rightarrow$  non-OECD Qs = 35 ( $\Rightarrow$  30% reduction in dirty goods production)
  - $\Rightarrow$  non-OECD QD = 50 ( $\Rightarrow$  no change in demand for dirty goods)
  - $\Rightarrow$  global QD = global QS = 75

 $\therefore$  OECD now responsible for just 33% of global demand and 53% of global supply  $\Rightarrow$  net effect of the change in OECD demand and supply is pollution *imports* into OECD nations and out of non-OECD nations, despite the fact that OECD nations have specialized in clean goods.

Problems with this view	<ul> <li>⇒ empirical evidence is mixed (at best)</li> <li>⇒ depends critically upon how we define "dirty goods"</li> <li>⇒ tells us nothing about concentration of production within "non-OECD" nations</li> <li>ie. @ t=0 non-OECD QS = 50 split between 2 producers (25 units each)</li> <li>@ t=1 now non-OECD QS = 35 produced by just 1 nation (concentration/pollution imports within non-</li> </ul>
	nation (concentration/pollution imports within non- OECD)

For more detailed discussion involving pollution exports between the US and Mexico see Grossman and Krueger (1992), "Environmental Impact of NAFTA". Rothman and de Bruyn (1998, p. 145) dispense with this "inverse exports" argument very efficiently.