



QUESTION 1

$g = h^2 + H$, $H > 0$

$|R = \frac{1}{6} (\frac{\delta}{\xi})^2|$ CASE 1




$|R > \frac{1}{6} (\frac{\delta}{\xi})^2|$ CASE 2




There is a steady-state, which is unique

$|0 < R < \frac{1}{6} (\frac{\delta}{\xi})^2|$ CASE 3



There is not steady-state

$|R = 0|$ CASE 4



There are two steady-states, both remain collocated

There are two steady-states, $h_1^* = 0$, $h_2^* > 0$

In case ① There is only one steady state, which is unstable if $k_0 > k_t^*$, and stable if $k_0 < k_t^*$. For reasons in growth rate, the thing stop growing when they reach k_t^* .
 With recession grow faster, with a growth rate that increases over time.
 This is due to the fact that the production function shows increasing returns to scale,

In case ② there is no steady-state. Economies grow forever.

In case ③ There are multiple steady-states. There is a poverty trap, because the low steady-state is globally stable. If you start from $k_0 < k_t^*$ or $k_0 < k_t^*$ there is going to be transitional growth (negative in the second case) and the economy will be stuck at k_t^* forever, and it gets there. Economies that start from $k_0 > k_t^*$ will grow forever instead.

In case ④, there is only one meaningful steady state: $k_t^* > 0$. For values of $B \leq 0$ the k_t^* is (global) steady-state which is then a negative k_t^* .

② Impose the SS. condition: $s y_t^* = \delta k_t^*$

$$s \left(\frac{6}{5} \right)^2 = \delta k_t^*$$

$$s (k_t^*)^2 + s B = \delta k_t^*$$

$$s (k_t^*)^2 - \delta k_t^* + s B = 0$$

$$k_t^* = \frac{1}{\delta} \left(\frac{6}{5} \right)^2$$

$$k_t^* = \frac{6}{25}$$

$$k_t^* = \left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{6}{25} \right)$$

$$k_t^* = \frac{1}{8} \left(\frac{6}{5} \right)^2$$

$$k_t^* = \left(1 + \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{6}{25} \right)$$

$$k_{t+2} = \frac{\frac{6}{5} \pm \sqrt{\left(\frac{6}{5} \right)^2 - 4B}}{2}$$

when $x_1^* = \frac{8}{25} \rightarrow y_1^* = \left(\frac{8}{25}\right)^2 + \frac{1}{4}\left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2 = 2\left(\frac{8}{25}\right)^2 = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2$

(2)

$$c^* = (n-5) \cdot \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2$$

$$s_1^* = \frac{5}{2} \left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2 = \frac{8^2}{25}$$

(3) See the derivation above,

(4) $B = \frac{1}{8} \left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2$ corresponds to var 3.

$$y_n^* = (x_n^*)^2 + B = \left(n - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}\right)^2 \left(\frac{8}{25}\right)^2 + \frac{1}{8} \cdot \left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2$$

$$s_1^* = 5 \cdot y_n^*$$

$$c_n^* = (n-5) y_n^*$$

$$y_{g_1}^* = (x_{g_1}^*)^2 + B = \left(n + \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}\right)^2 \left(\frac{8}{25}\right)^2 + \frac{1}{8} \left(\frac{8}{5}\right)^2$$

$$s_2^* = 5 \cdot y_{g_1}^*$$

$$c_2^* = (n-5) y_{g_1}^*$$

QUESTION 2

There are two consumption goods, and 2 control variables in this case,

$$\text{Max}_{c_1(t), c_2(t), a(t)} \int_{t=0}^{\infty} [\beta \log c_1(t) + (1-\beta) \log c_2(t)] e^{-\rho t} dt$$

s.t.

$$[N] \quad \dot{c}_1(t) \geq 0$$

$$[N] \quad \dot{c}_2(t) \geq 0$$

$$\dot{a}(t) = r a(t) + w(t) - \underbrace{p_1(t)=1}_{\downarrow} c_1(t) - \underbrace{p_2(t)=1}_{\downarrow} c_2(t)$$

[N] & [N] are always satisfied because of the log(.) utility.

The utility function is separable both over goods and over time. This implies that the marginal utility of consumption is not affected by past consumption decisions and by the consumption decision on the other good.

$$H(t) = \beta \log c_1(t) + (1-\beta) \log c_2(t) \cdot e^{-\rho t} + \lambda(t) [r a(t) + w(t) - c_1(t) - c_2(t)]$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial c_1} = 0 \quad \frac{\beta}{c_1(t)} \cdot e^{-\rho t} = \lambda(t)$$

$$\frac{\beta}{c_1(t)} = \frac{1-\beta}{c_2(t)} \quad \rightarrow c_1(t) = \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) c_2(t)$$

This condition tells us that $\gamma_{c_1} \equiv \frac{c_1}{c_1} = \frac{c_2}{c_2} = \gamma_{c_2}$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial a} = 0 \quad \frac{1-\beta}{c_2(t)} \cdot e^{-\rho t} = \lambda(t)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial a} = -\dot{\lambda} \quad w(t) - \lambda(t) = -\dot{\lambda}(t) \quad \rightarrow \dot{\lambda}(t) = r \lambda(t)$$

$$\text{TVL} \quad \lambda(t) \Big|_{t=0}^{t=\infty} = \lambda(t) e(t) \Big|_{t=0}^{t=\infty} = 0$$

The usual steps lead us to

$$\frac{C'(K)}{C(K)} = \frac{\lambda'(K)}{\lambda(K)} - \rho = \eta(K) - \rho$$

and

$$\frac{C'(L)}{C(L)} = \frac{\lambda'(L)}{\lambda(L)} - \rho = \eta(L) - \rho$$

so that $\delta_{K_1} = \delta_{L_1} = \eta(K) - \rho$: the usual costs go through for both investment goods

② For the CE we just have to consider the first order condition at the firm.

$$F(K, L) = K^\alpha \cdot L^{1-\alpha} = \left(\frac{K}{L}\right)^\alpha \cdot L^{1+\alpha} = k^\alpha \cdot L^{1+\alpha}$$

Marginal Product of labor = $K^\alpha \gamma_0$ Hence $W(L) = L^\alpha \gamma_0$

Define the profit function as

$$\pi = \frac{1}{L} \cdot \left\{ k^\alpha \cdot L^\alpha - w - (r + \delta) k \right\}$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial k} = 0 \quad \alpha k^{\alpha-1} \cdot L^\alpha = r + \delta \quad [3]$$

From $\pi = 0$ $W(L) = k^\alpha \cdot L^\alpha - \alpha k^{\alpha-1} \cdot L^\alpha - (r + \delta) k = (1-\alpha) k^\alpha \cdot L^\alpha$ [4]

Notice that $MP_L = k^\alpha \cdot L^\alpha \gamma_0 > (1-\alpha) k^\alpha \cdot L^\alpha = W(L)$, which confirms our result that

$$W(L) = L^\alpha \gamma_0$$

Impose the asset market equilibrium $e = \lambda$, then the budget constraint is going to be:

$$\lambda(t) = w(t) \cdot \lambda(t) + w(t) - c_1(t) - c_2(t) \quad [5]$$

Substituting [3] and [4] into [5] gets

$$\lambda(t) = [\lambda \lambda^{t-1} L^t - \delta] \lambda + (1-\lambda) \lambda^2 L^t - c_1 - c_2 = \lambda^t L^t - \delta \lambda - c_1 - c_2 \quad [6]$$

[6] is the aggregate law of motion for the economy. Notice that it depends on the two types of consumption.

We derive three equations describing the evolution of the economy over time

$$\begin{cases} \dot{c}_1 = \lambda \lambda^{t-1} L^t - \delta - \rho \\ \dot{c}_2 = \lambda \lambda^{t-1} L^t - \delta - \rho \\ \dot{\lambda} = \lambda^t L^t - \delta \lambda - c_1 - c_2 = \lambda^t L^t - \delta \lambda - c \end{cases}$$

with $c_1 + c_2 \equiv c$ being aggregate consumption.

③ For the S.S. we have $\dot{c}_1 = \dot{c}_2 = \dot{\lambda} = 0$

From $\dot{c}_1 = \dot{c}_2 = 0$ we get the same condition, that is

$$(\lambda^*)^{t-1} = \frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \rightarrow \lambda^* = \left[\frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-t}}$$

Consider aggregate consumption

$$\begin{aligned} c^* &= (\lambda^*)^t L^t - \delta \lambda^* = \left[\frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \right]^{\frac{t}{1-t}} L^t - \delta \left[\frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-t}} \\ c^* &= \left[\frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \right]^{\frac{t}{1-t}} L^t - \delta \left[\frac{\rho + \delta}{\lambda L^t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-t}} \end{aligned}$$

Now we use $c_1^* = c_1^* + c_2^*$ together with $c_1^* = \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) c_2^* \rightarrow c_2^* = \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) c_1^* + c_2^* = \frac{c_2^*}{1-\beta}$


$$c_2^* = (1-\beta) c_1^* = (1-\beta) \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \left[\left(\frac{\beta}{\rho+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - \delta \left(\frac{\beta}{\rho+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}\right]$$

$$c_1^* = \beta c_2^* = \beta \left(\frac{\beta}{\rho+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \left[\left(\frac{\beta}{\rho+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - \delta \left(\frac{\beta}{\rho+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}\right]$$

④ $C = c_1 + c_2$, hence $\dot{c} = \rho c^{\alpha} c^{\beta} - \delta c - c$ in the case of utility for capital



$$\dot{c} = c_1 + c_2 = \left[\alpha \rho^{\alpha-1} c^{\alpha} - \delta - \rho\right] \cdot c_1 + \left[\alpha \rho^{\alpha-1} c^{\alpha} - \delta - \rho\right] \cdot c_2 = \left[\alpha \rho^{\alpha-1} c^{\alpha} - \delta - \rho\right] (c_1 + c_2) = \left[\alpha \rho^{\alpha-1} c^{\alpha} - \delta - \rho\right] c$$

So the graphical representation is very similar to the New-Classic Ramsey case.




④

5) p decreases to $p' < p$



Consumption jumps on consumption in the neighborhoods become more persistent. In this example it
 he moves from the initial steady-state value to the new "initial" level c'_t that rises on
 the stable branch leading to the new steady-state. Consumption rises smoothly during the
 transition, just like capital. The drop in consumption is needed to allow a higher investment, leading
 to a higher steady-state capital stock k^{*1} .



The steady-state capital k^{*1} increases because

$$\frac{dk^*}{dt} = \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha} \right) \left[\frac{K^* L^{1-\alpha}}{p+\delta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \cdot \left(\frac{c^* + K^* \delta}{p+\delta} \right) > 0$$

The dynamics of consumption and capital are similar
 to the previous case. However, this time we don't
 know if consumption will jump up or down, because
 the production increases at T . It all boils
 down on how steep the stable arm are.