Value Change and Reorientations in Citizen-State Relations

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Significant shifts in the dynamics of citizen-state relations have taken place throughout the advanced industrial world over the last two decades or so and a growing body of evidence suggesting that these reorientations in citizen-state relations have been shaped by value changes that have taken place among publics. On these two broad themes there is a consensus.1 But that consensus fragments somewhat when it comes to providing answers to such second order questions as: What are the causes of these transformations? What are the most important dimensions of these value changes? What are their implications? And, how can the negative consequences of some of these shifts be addressed?

The aim of this article is to assemble some of the core empirical findings and interpretations concerning Canadian value shifts and how these mediate citizens’ relations with the state. Relations between citizens and the state are bilateral; they can be disturbed from either direction. The prevailing view is that this relationship has been fundamentally modified and disturbed not so much because states have changed but because citizens have changed.2 There is a new political culture.

Neither values, nor institutions, exist in a vacuum and the place to begin is with the context and by considering the structural factors that are the...
foundation for interpreting broad-gauged shifts in citizenship values. Values, which are sometimes referred to as core beliefs, have to do with conceptions of what is desirable and they form the basis of judgements citizens have about their social, economic, and political worlds. The second task is to examine the available strands of evidence that tell us something about Canadian values and how they relate to governance in this setting. Two kinds of evidence are of special relevance in this respect. The first concerns indications of cross-time shifts in what might be regarded as core citizenship values, and the second concerns how these particular values are related to each other. The third task is to evaluate the evidence and to consider some of the possible policy implications of these findings.

**Structural Change**

Nearly 40 years ago, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba launched a pioneering study examining civic cultures in five countries. That project emphatically made the point that to understand variations in the success of democratic political systems, it is necessary to move beyond an exclusive preoccupation with their institutional and constitutional features and to incorporate explicitly an understanding of the political orientations of citizens within the political system. By placing the notion of “political culture” at the centre of their analysis, Almond and Verba built a conceptual bridge linking the micro-worlds of individual citizens to the macro-world of the institutions that perform the tasks of governance. And, in the process of building that conceptual bridge they drew a distinction between “culture” in general, and “political culture.” According to Almond and Verba, “culture” refers to “psychological orientations towards social objects,” while political culture refers more narrowly to “the particular distribution of patterns of orientations towards political objects.”

With the advantages of hindsight, and the benefit of 40 years worth of empirical research, it is not difficult to find fault with Almond and Verba’s original project. But the fundamental contribution of their path-breaking work remains intact: most analysts now accept the premise that citizen values matter to the successful functioning of democratic societies because at a very fundamental level, values have to do with what people want out of life. The values, or core beliefs, of citizens have important practical consequences because they shape preferences and guide expectations, and because citizens in democratic societies have regular opportunities — elections — for expressing those preferences and for evaluating whether the performance of governments has met public expectations.

Most advanced industrial states have experienced significant structural transformations since the early 1960s and these transformations have profoundly reshaped the settings in which representative democratic institutions work. The pace of these changes has varied from one country to the next, but the essential point is that the basic character of these structural changes is replicated again and again in the post-1945 histories of virtually all West European states as well as in Canada and the United States. The core features of these structural shifts have been documented elsewhere, but it is useful to summarize the major contours of these changes because they provide a vital context for interpreting the shape, scope, and implications of value change.

First, all advanced industrial states have experienced dramatic increases in wealth during the latter half of the twentieth century. The trajectories toward greater wealth have not been entirely smooth. For example, most states experienced temporary economic reversals during the oil crisis, and there have been periods of stagnation both in the 1970s and the 1980s. But these economic reversals over the last 20 years have been relatively short-lived; from the late 1940s to the end of the 1990s the overall trend has been one of economic expansion. To be sure, this sustained economic growth has not eradicated poverty, but the vast majority of citizens
in all these states are now far wealthier than their compatriots of preceding generations.

A second significant structural change concerns shifts in the sources of wealth. In the immediate post-war period, much of the economic growth in the Western world came from increased efficiencies in, and the expansion of, the industrial sector. By the late 1960s, that changed as the balance in the wealth-generating activities began to shift from the industrial sector to the tertiary sectors of these economies. One benchmark separating industrial from advanced industrial states concerns the proportion of the labour force working in the tertiary sector. Economies qualify as “advanced industrial” when more than 50 percent of the paid workforce is employed in the tertiary sector.9 Most West European countries, as well as Canada and the United States, crossed that threshold by the early 1980s. Simply put, what the vast majority of people now do for a living is substantially different from the work of previous generations.

The remarkably rapid expansion of the technology and service sectors of the economies of advanced industrial states would not have been possible had it not been for yet another structural change — a dramatic expansion of access to post-secondary education. Knowledge-based economies are unthinkable without a supply of knowledge workers. Once again, regardless of the variations in the rates at which this “education revolution” took place,10 the consequences of expanding educational opportunities have had strikingly similar effects — the rapid expansion of the middle classes, and greater occupational and geographic mobility. The impacts of these kinds of transformations reverberate throughout society. For example, the dramatic rise in the number of women entering post-secondary educational institutions has produced profound changes in the gender composition of the paid workforce. These two shifts, in turn, have had a significant impact on family incomes and family structures.11

Other related structural transformations have taken place in the areas of communications and information. Modern means of communications — computers, satellites, cable — have massively reduced the costs of gaining access to information. Information from around the world is now almost immediately and directly accessible to larger and larger segments of publics in advanced industrial states. Parallel shifts have taken place in transportation. The ever-broadening accessibility to modern modes of transportation, coupled with dramatic advances in electronic communications, means that hardly any corner of the world now qualifies as “remote.”

The combined effects of these changes mean that the institutions of democratic governance, which were designed and took their initial shape during an industrial era, now operate in a profoundly different environment. Much of the available evidence indicates that citizens’ values, as well as their skills and the expectations they have of governments, underwent significant changes in step with these structural shifts. And given what we know about the permeability of economic, social, and the political dynamics, it would be remarkable indeed if the structural transformations reshaping the society and the economy over the last 25 years, were to have had no impact whatsoever on the political dynamics of how citizens are connected to the state.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND VALUE CHANGE

The linkages between the structural shift from deep industrialism to advanced industrialism and value change have been specified in a variety of ways. Daniel Bell provides an arresting account of some of the essential themes. The transitions from pre-industrial to industrial society, and from industrial to advanced industrial society produce fundamental changes not only in people’s daily life experiences, but also in prevailing worldviews.12 Bell characterizes pre-industrial life as a “game
against nature” in which one’s “sense of the world is conditioned by the vicissitudes of the elements — the seasons, the storms, the fertility of the soil, the amount of water, the depth of the mine seams, the droughts and the floods.”13 Industrialization provided greater control over and less dependence on the natural environment. With the consolidation of industrialization, life became a “game against fabricated nature,”14 a technical, mechanical, rationalized, bureaucratic world directed toward the external problem of creating and dominating the made environment. With the emergence of post-industrial societies, worldviews were re-directed yet again. Because life in advanced industrial societies centres on services, it can be aptly characterized as a “game between persons.”15 Most people spend their productive hours dealing with other people and symbols. Less effort is focused on producing material objects and more is focused on communicating and processing information. For Bell, the hallmark value shift associated with the transition to advanced industrialism is the increased salience of “individual autonomy.” Some observers characterize the transition to advanced industrialism as a shift away from “solidarity towards self-affirmation.”16 Others associate it with the emergence of “individualization.”17 And yet others focus on the rise of “expressivism”18 or “self expression.”19 The precise language used to describe what is taken to be the most central axis of value change varies, but the differences are of degree rather than fundamental; the perspectives are congenial.

One of the most influential accounts of how value change is linked to the emergence of late advanced industrialism is supplied by Inglehart.20 This basic explanation is useful to recount because it is plausible and it is firmly grounded in other well-established premises. The value change thesis argues that the economic security created by advanced industrial societies gradually changes the goal orientations of citizens. In the process, Abramson and Inglehart suggest, “an emphasis on economic security gradually fades, and universal but often latent needs for belonging, esteem, and the realization of intellectual potential become increasingly prominent.”21 Individuals will still place some value on such “materialist” concerns as economic and physical security, they claim, but such “postmaterialist” or higher order concerns as the need for self-expression, freedom, and the quality of life become increasingly prominent.

This particular explanation for value change has not been universally embraced but it does have a number of strengths. One strength is that it is not a disembodied or ahistorical account in the sense that it acknowledges the importance of the kinds of structural changes that are outlined above. For example, Inglehart’s claim that value change is gradual is grounded both in a combination of socialization theory and the timing of the onset of widespread prosperity. From the standpoint of socialization theory, formative conditions and experiences matter; the expectation is that those who grew up during periods of scarcity and physical insecurity, the Depression and the Second World War, tend to retain materialist orientations. By contrast, those socialized during the era of post-war prosperity, and who are more inclined toward higher order values, are gradually replacing older groups who experienced deprivation during their formative years.

A second strength of this kind of account is that it produces clear expectations about the sociodemographic distribution of these value changes. Huge volumes of data from multiple countries over several decades indicate not only that the values associated with the new political culture do seem to be becoming more widespread among publics in advanced industrial states, but also that the value transformations are associated with generational change. They are most pronounced among the younger generations.22 There is also compelling evidence indicating that these shifting value orientations have consequences for changing public agendas. It turns out that those segments of the public that have internalized “new values” are less supportive of the kinds of redistributive policies that were once central to the agendas of traditional
### Table 1
Shifting Orientations in 12 Advanced Industrial Countries including Canada, 1981-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Orientations</th>
<th>Direction of Change in all 12 Advanced Industrial Countries*</th>
<th>Direction of Change in Canada</th>
<th>Correlated with Postmaterialist</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>rising 12/12</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in govt inst</td>
<td>falling 10/12</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in non-govt inst</td>
<td>falling 10/12</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest potential</td>
<td>rising 11/12</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil permissiveness</td>
<td>rising 9/12</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General deference</td>
<td>falling 10/12</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>rising 7/12</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>rising 8/12</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>yes (-)</td>
<td>yes (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Orientations**

|                        |                                                               |                               | Age                             | Education  | Value Type |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| Importance of work     | falling 9/11                                                  | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Support for meritocracy| rising 12/12                                                  | rising                         | yes (+)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Pride in work          | rising 12/12                                                  | rising                         | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Worker expressiveness  | falling 7/12                                                  | falling                        | yes (-)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Workplace obedience    | falling 6/12                                                  | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Worker participation   | rising 6/12                                                   | rising                         | yes (-)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Job satisfaction       | falling 8/12                                                  | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (+)    | yes (-)    |
| Financial satisfaction | falling 7/12                                                  | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (+)    | yes (-)    |

**Social Orientations**

|                        |                                                               |                               | Age                             | Education  | Value Type |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| Importance of God      | falling 10/12                                                 | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Church attendance      | falling 10/12                                                 | falling                        | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Moral permissiveness   | rising 10/12                                                  | rising                         | yes (-)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Principle of tolerance | rising 12/12                                                  | rising                         | weak                            | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Social intolerance     | rising 11/12                                                  | rising                         | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Racial intolerance     | rising 9/12                                                   | rising                         | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Political intolerance  | rising 11/12                                                  | rising                         | yes (+)                         | yes (-)    | yes (-)    |
| Egalitarian spousal relations | rising 12/12                              | rising                         | yes (-)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |
| Egalitarian parent-child relations | rising 12/12                               | rising                         | yes (-)                         | yes (+)    | yes (+)    |

Note: *Countries include: France, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, United States, and Canada.

political parties. More salient for them are issue orientations that reflect a preoccupation with the quality of life such as concern for the environment.

The particulars of Inglehart's or any other explanation for value change can be discounted or challenged on conceptual, methodological or a variety of other grounds. There is reliable evidence from independent researchers indicating that significant value changes have taken place among publics in advanced industrial states. Data from the World Values Survey suggest that there have been systematic shifts in a host of political, social, and economic orientations since the 1980s. These findings, summarized in Table 1, illustrate the cross-national consistency of these shifts. The directions of these changes are strikingly similar and the changes in Canada are almost precisely the same as those taking place among publics in 11 other advanced industrial states.

What is also striking is the extent to which all of these shifts, in each one of the 12 countries, are consistently and systematically related to age, education, and postmaterialist value type. The changes do not appear to be random; they conform to similar patterns in multiple settings. It is possible, of course, that Inglehart's explanation for these changes may not be satisfactory in every respect. But discounting that explanation does not change the fundamentals: the cumulative evidence seems to indicate coherent and non-random changes in the basic orientations of publics in advanced industrial states.

**Signs of Stress**

In the 1970s, a variety of observers began to notice that the political systems of many advanced industrial states seemed to be exhibiting signs of stress. Diagnoses of the problem varied. Some interpreted these stresses as evidence of government overload. Others argued that they signified a legitimacy crisis, and yet others suggested that the stresses reflected a problem of "governability." Regardless of variations in the particulars of the diagnosis, there is some agreement about the symptoms. One cluster of symptoms has to do with evidence of significant shifts in electoral landscape of most advanced industrial states. Citizens seem to have become more fickle and less compliant. Certainly, some data point to a gradual erosion in the rates of electoral participation, although on this count most of the shifts would have to be characterized as glacial, and there are significant cross-national variations. A more significant sign of stress, perhaps, are indications that, since the 1970s, citizen attachments to political parties have become progressively weaker. The proportion of voting publics declaring themselves to be "strong" party identifiers, for example, has been on the decline in nearly every advanced industrial state for which there are comparable data. And there has also been a decline in the proportions of party memberships among these publics. One consequence of these shifts has been rising levels of voter volatility. More broadly still, long-standing party systems seemed to be in a state of flux.

Until the middle of the 1960s, navigating the electoral landscape was a comparatively easy task; political cleavages were widely characterized as relatively few and simple, and voting decisions were correspondingly simple. By the 1970s, the capacity of such cleavages as region and class that for generations had underpinned the bases of support for traditional parties seemed to be weakening. And by the middle of the 1980s, the trend toward realignment was well established in many advanced industrial states. Alongside these trends is evidence indicating that new parties with non-traditional agendas were emerging to challenge old parties.

Declining party memberships, shifting patterns of partisan behaviour, and the emergence of new axes of electoral mobilization represent three important indications of possible "stress." These dynamics deserve attention not least of all because in most representative democracies political parties...
carry the unique responsibility of connecting citizens to the state by aggregating, representing, and responding to citizens' interests. But, to focus only on the shifting foundations of political parties and rising levels of voter volatility captures a somewhat narrow slice of what counts as “political.” Moreover, to rely exclusively on these indicators as signs of stress encourages the conclusion that citizens in advanced industrial states are simply becoming more disengaged from, and less interested in, their political worlds.

Systematic comparative evidence embracing a much wider range of political behaviours among these same publics, however, points to a quite different conclusion. In Political Action, Barnes and Kaase and their collaborators clearly demonstrate that citizens in advanced industrial states are neither becoming less participatory nor more disengaged from their political worlds. Indeed, the data point to the opposite conclusion; citizens are becoming more interested in political matters and more inclined to participate in public life. Participation in such conventional political activities as voting may be flat, or declining modestly, but citizen engagement in unconventional forms of political behaviour is plainly on the rise. Since the middle of the 1970s, citizens have become more inclined to sign petitions, more likely to attend lawful demonstrations, more inclined to engage in boycotts, and more inclined to participate in new social movements. That publics are increasingly turning to alternative forms of political action may also be construed as yet another sign of stress. The increased popularity of these kinds of elite challenging behaviours may also signify a qualitative shift in how citizens choose to relate to the state or at least to those state institutions that continue to work from traditional hierarchical assumptions.

Value shifts have a lot to do with why these changes are taking place. But a more compelling and complete interpretation, perhaps, is that the shifting axes of citizen-state relations are a consequence of the interaction of value shifts with the kinds of structural changes outlined above. Consider the case of education. Recall that the “education explosion,” the surge in post-secondary educational opportunities, was characterized as one aspect of structural change associated with the transition to advanced industrialism. Expanding educational opportunities may well have been driven primarily by rising demand for a larger supply of knowledge workers, but growing levels of formal education within populations also have by-products that can reshape citizen-state relations. The basic idea that education is conducive to the development of citizen characteristics is rarely contested. More nuanced accounts, however, suggest that expanded educational opportunities can have an impact on citizen-state relations via at least two different and distinct pathways. One pathway concerns the connection between levels of formal education and what has been called “democratic enlightenment,” and the other has to do with political engagement. Education promotes democratic enlightenment in the sense that it encourages citizens to understand the long-term trade-offs necessary to sustain democratic life; it encourages tolerance and an understanding of, as well as adherence to, the norms and principles of democracy. On this particular dimension, the indications are that the effects of growing levels of higher education within a population are additive and cumulative: the higher the levels of formal education within a public, the greater the adherence to democratic norms.

With the second pathway, political engagement, the impacts of expanding educational opportunities are more complex; they involve a resorting process. Engagement includes the capacity to formulate considered policy preferences, and to act on one’s own behalf to seek political goals. The ways in which higher education promotes these capacities are well documented. People with higher levels of formal education have a greater capacity to organize and comprehend politically relevant information. The more educated are also more interested in their political worlds, which means that they have a stronger motivation to seek out politically relevant informa-
tion, and this in an environment where the costs of gaining access to information have been dramatically lowered. Further, a high level of education is associated with such politically relevant attributes as higher levels of efficacy and an increased capacity to articulate interests. It is for this combination of reasons that higher levels of education better equip citizens to be more actively engaged. The effects of education apply not only to values — encouraging stronger adherence to democratic norms — but also to citizens’ political capacities. The expansion of education produces a more articulate, better informed, more engaged, and more sophisticated citizenry. It is also a more demanding citizenry.

Growing access to higher education, then, is a structural change that has had a profound effect on the redistribution of politically relevant skills. It is the timing of the educational revolution that provides clues about how structural changes and value shifts interact. The expansion of post-secondary education coincided, approximately, with the shift toward those worldviews associated with advanced industrialism. Hence, those generations socialized in an environment of post-war material security are not only equipped with a new set of participatory skills, but also they carry a new set of preferences and expectations.

SHIFTS IN CITIZENS’ VALUES: CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZEN-STATE RELATIONS

The indications are that Canada has experienced the same kinds of political system stress as has been documented in other advanced industrial states. For instance, average levels of voter turnout in Canadian federal elections have tended to be slightly lower than those found in most other comparable industrial democracies: since 1945, voter participation rates in Canada average around 74 percent compared to 77 percent for all other democracies. Voter turnout at the most recent Canadian federal election dropped to 67 percent, the lowest since 1925. There is also evidence of high levels of electoral volatility and of rising levels of disenchantment with mainstream political parties. Then, there are clear indications of increased fluidity in the Canadian federal party system. The 1993 election was a watershed election as far as the party system is concerned: one long-standing “traditional” party suffered a crushing defeat and two entirely new parties emerged. The party system appears to be in transition. Alongside these changes is evidence of rising levels of unconventional forms of political behaviour on a scale comparable to that documented in other advanced industrial states. As in other states, these shifts may plausibly be interpreted as a consequence of the interplay of structural and value changes among citizens. But this kind of system-level evidence and the interpretation is certainly plausible but the evidence is nonetheless indirect. What is required is direct evidence.

The point of distinguishing between political culture and culture in general, according to Almond and Verba, was to draw attention to the importance of political objects in mediating citizen-state relations. “Political objects,” however, are not all of a kind. The notion of political support, for example, is multidimensional and so levels of support are likely to vary depending upon which particular political objects or orientations are under consideration. What kinds of political objects and values are central? There are several and they can be conceptually organized in at least two ways. Building on the work of others, Norris identifies five different kinds of political objects, or orientations, as basic to effective democratic governance. And as Figure 1 illustrates, these orientations can be distributed according to their generality or specificity.

At the most abstract level are attachments to the larger political community and to identities. In settings where the boundaries of the state and nation coincide, attachments to “the country” are less problematic than in settings where loyalties are more fractured along regional, linguistic, or religious lines. Most data indicate that citizen attachments to
their political community are relatively high and stable. There is evidence that there have been shifts in people’s communal horizons. Publics throughout most advanced industrial states have gradually become less parochial and more cosmopolitan but, significantly, these shifts have yet to have had much impact on aggregate levels of national pride.⁴⁴ In the broader context of the 22 countries for which directly comparable data are available, the levels of national pride in Canada rank third highest, behind only the United States and Ireland.

Support for regime principles also operates at a relatively high level of abstraction. There is no consensus about which particular regime principle is pre-eminent. Rather, support for regime principles typically envelops a cluster of values that include such ideas as freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for rights and the rule of law. According to Norris, it is the conjunction of these orientations that set the operational structure for the democratic regime.⁴⁵

Regime performance is less abstract; it concerns citizens’ evaluations of how well their own democracy performs in light of their expectations about how their democracy should work. The most widely used indicator of citizens’ views about regime performance comes from responses to the question: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?”

The fourth level of political objects is more grounded still; it concerns the levels of citizen confidence in an array of regime institutions — parliament, the courts, the civil service, and the police. Confidence in institutions serves as a middle-range indicator, one that lies between support for such overarching regime principles as “democracy,” and support for such specific political actors as elected government officials.⁴⁶ Evaluations of public confidence in institutions is most informative when understood comparatively because there are no agreed upon meaningful standards for what qualifies as “high” or “low” levels of confidence in institutions.⁴⁷ As will become apparent in Canada,

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**Figure 1**

Political Objects: Levels of Support and Trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most general</th>
<th>Political Object</th>
<th>Level and Trend for Advanced Industrial States</th>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most general</td>
<td>Political community (e.g., country)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most general</td>
<td>Regime principles (e.g., democracy)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Relatively stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most general</td>
<td>Regime performance (e.g., satisfaction with the way democracy works)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relatively stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most general</td>
<td>Institutions (parliament, courts, civil service, police)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Declining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most general</td>
<td>Political actors (leaders, elected representatives)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

when making their evaluations of these kinds of institutional objects, citizens do distinguish between different regime institutions, and it turns out that citizen confidence in parliament has eroded most of all.

The most concrete political objects that citizens evaluate are political actors: elected public officials. Here, the focus is upon these actors as a class of office holders, not as particular individuals. The available evidence is that elected public officials are not, typically, held in very high esteem, but there are wide cross-national variations as well as significant cross-time fluctuations in these kinds of public evaluations. 48

The conceptual scheme outlined by Norris provides a very useful starting point: it identifies which kinds of political objects are central and it makes the important point that there are significant variations in the generality and specificity of these objects. Norris’s guidelines can also be extended in directions that are even more helpful for understanding the underlying dynamics of citizen-state relations. Not only is it useful to know how citizens’ orientations have changed along each of the dimensions that Norris identifies, it is also useful to understand if, and how, each of these orientations are related to each other. To what extent are these orientations also linked to such dispositions as trust, to knowledge and to associational life, dimensions that are also viewed as contributing to a vibrant democracy? 49 Moreover, given the interaction of structural and value shifts, it is also important to know how these new political cultural orientations are distributed throughout the population. Then there is the question of how all of these orientations are connected to citizen behaviour, to how citizens view

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**Figure 2**
Value Change and Citizen-State Relations

[Diagram showing the relationships between Citizen-State relations, including Confidence in Institutions, Satisfaction with Democracy, External Efficacy, Confidence in Institutions, Political Trust, and more.]

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their representatives, and to how elected representatives, in turn, understand their roles. These are the central research questions that guide the investigation of value change in Canada, and this extension of Norris’s schema is summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2 organizes these relevant dimensions around two nodes. The dimensions clustering around the “state” in the upper part of the figure are concerned with how citizens evaluate the state, its institutions, and legislators. And the lower cluster refers to the attributes of citizens themselves — their capacities, orientations, and behaviours.

THE EVIDENCE

The ideal data for mapping value change would be those coming from longitudinal panel studies in which the same individuals are repeatedly asked the same questions about their values at different interludes. With these kinds of data, it would not only be possible to track individual value change quite precisely, but also to determine the extent to which any detected value shift is attributable to life-cycle or generational effects. The limitation in this instance is a practical one: there is no single longitudinal panel study in Canada that explores cross-time changes in these particular citizens’ orientations.

Absent such data, the next best alternative is to turn to reliable cross-sectional data, data that contain relevant and comparable indicators and that have been collected from random samples of the same population at different interludes. Compared to many other advanced industrial states, publicly available Canadian data sources of this variety are scarce. The challenge is to make the most of those data that are available. Before presenting the core findings, it is important to identify explicitly what combination of strategies the value trend researchers used to address these limitations.

One strategy is to seek out longitudinal evidence wherever it is available. For example, when it comes to evidence of some specific political orientations toward the Canadian political system, the Canadian Election Studies are an invaluable source not least of all because they contain data on political orientations across a 35-year time span. These kinds of data tell us about value changes within the Canadian setting but they can also be difficult to interpret. The point is a straightforward one: to be able to say anything meaningful about whether the level of support for the political community rates as “high” or “low,” for example, there needs to be some base of comparison. The question is: High or low compared to what? The most relevant points of comparison, for the reasons that have already been outlined, are other countries that exhibit similar characteristics, namely, other advanced industrial states. And so a second research strategy is to seek out comparable cross-national data wherever possible.

Cross-time, cross-sectional data are valuable, but secondary data sets of this variety are often designed to address research questions that are somewhat different from those that are of primary interest to secondary data users. In these circumstances, a reasonable alternative, and one followed in this project, is to rely on specialized data sets that allow for a systematic analysis of the linkages between key indicators or of key segments of the population. Young’s investigation sheds light on the connections between civic engagement, trust, and democracy using data from a single province. Docherty’s analysis, using data from a survey of legislators, sheds light on how elected legislators view their roles as representatives.

All data are limited in one way or another and these limitations have to be acknowledged. Certainly, there are reasons to be cautious when drawing conclusions about value change on the basis of cross-sectional data collected at a single time point. Nonetheless, it is possible to make informed inferences. For example, if we know on the basis of one study using cross-time data that public confidence in institutions, or trust, reflects generational effects then it is reasonable to suppose that a correlation between age and trust found in another set of data...
collected from the same population at a single time point might also be plausibly interpreted as indicating generational effects. Nor is it unreasonable to draw inferences across populations. For example, Nie and colleagues detail the impact of higher education on citizen enlightenment and participation in the American setting. Absent data indicating otherwise, it is reasonable to suppose that the spread of higher education would likely have similar enlightenment and participation effects in the Canadian setting.

**The Core Findings**

**Satisfaction with Democracy**

One widely used benchmark for tapping citizens’ evaluations of their political system comes from responses to the question: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country? There are very good reasons for expecting Canadians to express very high levels of satisfaction. As Nadeau points out, the United Nations Human Development report, 1994-1998, ranks Canada first among all countries on the quality of life; the country is at peace, it is affluent; and, by most standards, the rights and liberties of citizens are well entrenched and widely respected. Here, it is the cross-national benchmarks for comparison that are vital for interpretation. Certainly, when compared with citizens of India, Taiwan, or Mexico, Canadian levels of satisfaction do indeed look very high. But when compared with the responses from citizens in other similarly affluent, old, established liberal democracies, the results are less gratifying. Canadian levels of satisfaction with democracy are on a par with those found among publics in Ireland and the Netherlands, but they are significantly lower than those found in Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, and pre-unification West Germany. Just one in ten Canadians say they are “very satisfied” and a substantial one in three expresses “little satisfaction” with the way democracy works in the country.

What explains these findings? Why are Canadians less satisfied than might be expected? Who is least satisfied? And are these variations in levels of satisfaction related to those orientations and citizen attributes that are outlined in Figure 2?

In answering those questions, Nadeau delves into Canadian Election Study data and finds that some of the pillars that prop up citizens’ satisfaction with democracy are relatively fragile. As Norris’s work would suggest, part of the answer has to do with people’s attachment to their political community, Canada. Attachment to Canada, confidence in the federal government and the courts, identification with a federal political party, and a positive evaluation of politicians are all significant and positive predictors of higher levels of satisfaction with the workings of Canadian democracy. Moreover, there are significant socio-demographic markers. Predictably, wealthier and better educated Canadians, along with those born outside the country, all express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

These initial findings are relatively straightforward, but a deeper investigation of indirect effects yields a slightly more revealing and nuanced picture, one that identifies clear pockets of discontent. First, there is a very substantial gap between francophones in Quebec and others when it comes to attachments to Canada. That finding should come as little surprise, but the additional relevant point is that these orientations spill over into negative views of the federal government, the courts, and politicians. Second, there is also evidence of age-related effects. The young are significantly more weakly attached to Canada, and they evaluate the federal government, political parties, and politicians significantly more negatively than do their older counterparts. There is a third important finding: a very substantial proportion of Canadians, some 53 percent, indicates that they feel that they have little say in what the government does. It turns out that these feelings of voicelessness are not related to people’s attachments to their broader political community; feeling voiceless does not make citizens less attached to Canada. But this voicelessness does have a powerful and negative effect on their level of
satisfaction with the way democracy works, and on their evaluations of the federal government, the courts, politicians, and political parties.

**Human Capital**

The importance of the interactions between value change and structural change is brought into clear focus by Kanji’s analysis which builds on, and fills out, some of Nadeau’s findings. In general, Canadian Election Study data gathered since 1965 show that Canadians’ confidence in their political institutions is low, their trust in elected officials is low and declining, and there is a downward trend in external efficacy. That is, Canadians are increasingly likely to believe both that the “government doesn’t care much about what people like me think” and that “elected officials soon lose touch with the people.” These cross-time shifts are not always smooth, but there is an aggregate trend. As citizens’ evaluations of government responsiveness are becoming harsher, there is evidence of growing citizen competence, or what Kanji and others refer to as human capital. Human capital has to do with a cluster of attributes — such as greater knowledge, more attentiveness

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**Figure 3**

The Efficacy Gap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>External Efficacy</th>
<th>Internal Efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**External Efficacy:**
1. “Generally, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people.”
2. “I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think.”
   (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, and No Opinion)

**Internal Efficacy:**
1. “Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.”
2. “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.”
   (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, and No Opinion.)

Note: The percentages reported in the figure are the average scores from the two items in the internal and external efficacy indices. Only the “disagree” and “strongly disagree” responses are used in the calculation of the averages. “No opinion” responses are excluded from the analysis.

to politically relevant information, greater interest in the political world, reduced reliance on political parties for information and cues — that along with rising levels of education make citizens more autonomous. These findings mirror changes that have been documented in other advanced industrial states, and at one level they seem to signify a narrowing of the “skill gap” between citizens and elected officials. This narrowing of the skill gap appears to be accompanied by other dynamics.

The research findings regarding “efficacy” provide a graphic illustration of the changing relationship between citizens and their political system. External efficacy refers to how responsive citizens believe the political system is to their demands. Internal efficacy, the other side of that same conceptual coin, refers to subjective competence which has to do with how much influence an individual citizen feels they can have on the political process. The data summarized in Figure 3, drawn from the Canadian Election Studies, point to an intriguing and arguably important trend, namely, the emergence of an “efficacy gap.”

According to these data, levels of internal efficacy have increased slightly over the 23-year period; Canadians have become somewhat less inclined to believe that politics is “so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on,” and less likely to think that “people like me don’t have any say about what the government does.” This finding is consistent with what one would expect to find given that higher internal efficacy is positively related to higher education and larger segments of the Canadian public have experienced higher education over the course of the last two decades. But over the same period, levels of external efficacy have eroded: Canadians became significantly more inclined to believe that those who are “elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people” and that government doesn’t “care much about what people like me think.” In effect, as peoples’ sense of their own subjective political competence has been sustained, their evaluations of the responsiveness of their own political system have been declining. This “efficacy gap” has widened quite sharply since 1988. Furthermore, a detailed investigation of these data clearly shows that low levels of external efficacy are linked to low confidence in governmental institutions and mistrust of politicians. The findings are statistically significant.

Social Capital

Like efficacy, trust is a fundamental social and political orientation that has been theoretically and empirically linked to the effective performance of democratic systems. In Putnam’s scheme of things, civic engagement is a precondition for the accumulation of social capital (norms of reciprocity and trust), which are conducive to the effective functioning of democratic governments. Consequently, the civil society/social capital explanation asserts that declining levels of civic engagement lead to a decline in “social capital,” which ultimately “erode the basis on which democratic governance flourishes.”

Using individual level data from the 1999 Alberta Civil Society Survey, Young develops three measures of engagement: (i) Civic engagement — participation in non-political, non-market civic organizations; (ii) Professional engagement — involvement in unions and professional or business organizations; and (iii) Political engagement — membership in a political party and membership in a political action group other than a political party. Social capital is measured by gauging levels of interpersonal trust and democratic governance is measured by probing people’s trust in government and confidence in political institutions.

Here, the data show that civic engagement is a strong predictor of interpersonal trust, a finding that lends support to Putnam’s civil-society/social-capital explanation. Citizens who are active by being involved within the community are much more likely to express greater levels of interpersonal trust. Other predictors of interpersonal trust include fear of walking in one’s neighbourhood at night (the strongest predictor), general life satisfaction, age (positive effect), and education (also a positive effect).
But what explains citizens’ trust in government and confidence in governmental institutions? It turns out that interpersonal trust is a strong predictor of trust in government and confidence in political institutions, but civic engagement is not. The implication is that any meaningful effect that civic engagement might have on trust and confidence in governmental institutions is indirect. It works mainly through interpersonal trust and then indirectly from interpersonal trust to confidence and trust in governmental institutions.

Political efficacy turns out to be positively linked to confidence in the federal government, the provincial government, and political parties. Young’s analysis supports Roese’s finding that political activism is positively related to distrust in government, and the evidence is consistent with the cognitive mobilization hypothesis; individuals who are more closely involved with the political system are dissatisfied with what they see.

What about age effects? Albertans under the age of 35 are the least trusting of others in general, but have the highest trust and confidence in governments and political institutions, respectively. Baby boomers (between the ages of 35 and 44) are the least confident in political institutions. If these age variants are really driven by generational rather than life-cycle effects, then the expectation would be that confidence in government would increase over time as new generations replace the cynical baby boomers in the population. But it is difficult, on the basis of cross-sectional data, to demonstrate whether these age-related dynamics reflect generational or life-cycle effects.

Trust
Roese’s analysis probes the issue of trust in greater detail and shows that Canadians’ trust in the federal government is on the decline, a trend that is consistent with data from other western industrial states. Evidence to support this conclusion comes from the Canadian Election Studies between 1965 and 1993, the 1981 and 1990 World Values Surveys, and the American National Election Surveys since 1958. But as Roese argues, these findings can be interpreted in two ways: a negative interpretation that focuses on “individual political disengagement” and a positive interpretation that stresses the “value of healthy skepticism born of increasing individual cognitive sophistication.” Findings drawn from the data lend support to the positive notion of trust to demonstrate that skepticism toward the government may, in fact, be associated with greater levels of political engagement.

Is the decline in trust toward the Canadian government attributable to a general decline in interpersonal trust among citizens? The data suggest not. In fact, World Values data from 1981 and 1990 show that interpersonal trust has been rising in Canada.

It is possible that people’s decreasing trust of their government is connected to a more widespread cynicism about large institutions. Once again, however, the data do not support that line of speculation. Canadians’ trust in “major companies” has fallen between 1981 and 1990. This decrease is marginal compared to the decline in trust in the federal government.

There are also some substantively important non-findings to emerge. Declining trust in government is not associated to any shifts in the economic status of Canadians. Negative psychological factors unleashed as a result of unemployment, such as feelings of reduced empowerment, reduced satisfaction, and reduced happiness, have no impact on people’s perception of trust in their government. The same applies to general life satisfaction, job satisfaction, household financial satisfaction, and home-life satisfaction — none of these has any significant impact on people’s trust in government. Levels of satisfaction for each of the above items have remained constant between 1981 and 1990.

What does help to explain declining levels of trust in government is internal efficacy and political
activism. Out of the five variables entered into a regression analysis (internal efficacy; political activism; proselytization, that is how often an individual attempts to persuade friends, relatives or fellow workers to share his or her view; interest in politics; and left-right political ideology), only political activism (beta = -0.12) and internal efficacy (beta = -0.08) have significant independent effects on declining trust. In other words, the more empowered Canadians feel, the less they trust government. The American data are similar to Canada’s except that, in the United States, interest in politics also appears to be linked to trust. In Western Europe, all five predictors help to explain declining trust with the strongest predictor being interest in politics (beta = 0.17).

There may well be other factors that help to explain the decline in trust among Canadians. These shifts might be partly determined by the media’s more active role in news coverage, especially scandals involving politicians, and greater use of negative campaign ads that helps to build an image of a “bad government.” Another possible explanation could be that the government has failed to meet the heightened expectations of citizens in the age of postmaterialism.

The Representation “Gap”
Independent analyses produce converging conclusions about citizen evaluations of their political environment. A clear majority of Canadians believe that governments are non-responsive to them; confidence in parliament and political parties is low, and people do not trust their elected officials. These findings, the data suggest, are at least partly attributable to the structural and value changes documented earlier: citizens are more critical, less deferential, and perhaps more cynical. But these same findings also suggest a second set of questions: Why do citizens hold these particular actors and institutions in such low esteem? What is it about the MP’s role or behaviour that elicits these kinds of evaluations? Why do an increasing number of Canadians, regardless of income or education levels, believe that politicians soon “lose touch” with the people who elected them?

Docherty’s analysis provides some important insights into these questions. He argues that there are two parallel developments taking place. One concerns the changing attitudes and capacities of citizens themselves; the new political culture encourages publics to be more articulate and critical. The other concerns the perceptions that MPs and citizens have about what priorities elected representatives should have. There is a gap between their respective views of representation.

Relying on a combination of surveys of members of the thirty-fourth Parliament of Canada, candidates for office for the 1993 federal election and rookie members of the thirty-fifth Parliament, along with Canadian Election Study surveys and Gallup data, Docherty demonstrates, first, that the belief that politicians “lose touch” is broadening and deepening throughout Canadian society. Second, he shows that the public believes that the first priority of members of parliament should be to “keep in touch with constituents about what government is doing” whereas those in the thirty-fourth Parliament (1988-93) say that “helping people who have personal problems with government” is their first priority. There is a third significant finding. It appears that the priorities of MPs shift during the course of their career cycle as elected officials. The priorities of rookie MPs are much closer to those of citizens; the longer an MP holds office the further their priorities drift away from the expectations of the public. These data suggest that the public perception of MPs “losing touch” is an accurate one. This drift from one modality of representation to another may well, Docherty suggests, have to do with the shift in the political centre of gravity toward Cabinet and the increased difficulties MPs face in influencing policy direction. In that environment, members of parliament have a greater incentive to give priority to those things that they can change, not to those things over which they have a diminishing ability to influence.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Demonstrating causality with any kind of empirical data is a treacherous business, and for that reason the usual practice is to steer well clear of language suggesting that data demonstrate, or “prove,” causal direction. Nonetheless, speculating about the most likely causal directions can be instructive, particularly when ruminating about the possible policy implications of the findings. In considering the various policy implications suggested by the authors, it is also useful to consider the larger contextual issue set out here.

If the stresses experienced by the Canadian state are attributable to value change, then it might well be argued that policy prescriptions are necessarily uncertain because values are in a state of continual evolution. A reversal of economic fortunes, to return to Inglehart’s account of advanced industrial value change, might be accompanied by a resurgence of materialist orientations. And indeed, there is some evidence indicating that such short-term reversals have taken place.66 Values are uncertain but when they do change they do so slowly. Nonetheless, if the stresses are attributable to the interaction of such structural factors as the spread of post-secondary education along with value change, then the policy implications are rather different. Economic reversals may induce citizens to become less postmaterialist in their orientations, but they do not make citizens less educated, less attentive, less interested, or less informed about their political world. Nor do they diminish citizens’ capacities. The combined effects of the changes associated with late industrialism have made it easier for citizens to make demands on those who govern them. But, it is not at all clear that those same changes have made it any easier for governments to respond to citizen demands.

We began with the observation that in the bilateral relationship between citizens and the state, the weight of the evidence is that perturbations in citizen-state relations may be mostly attributable to the changing values and capacities of citizens. But this should not rule out considering the possibilities of institutional adaptation. What measures can institutions take to address some of the problem areas that the research identifies? One such area concerns the perception on the part of citizens that elected representatives are not responsive. Labelling the “efficacy gap” a “crisis” probably overstates the case. But it is a worrying trend plainly identified in the research data. Evidently one reason why citizens think that governments are not responsive is that office holders do not give a high priority to “keeping in touch with constituents about what the government is doing.” The policy implication is that elected officials should develop a much clearer appreciation of what citizens expect of them.

A second recurring theme concerns the connection between low levels of trust in elected officials and confidence in governmental institutions. Once again, the direction of causality is not entirely certain; the relationship between these orientations is likely to be reciprocal. Citizens expect their elected officials to have high standards of conduct.67 Regardless of the reasonableness of that expectation, the evidence is that citizens’ confidence in public officials declines when those high standards are not seen to be met. The same seems to apply to election campaign promises. For example, confidence in the federal government is much lower among Canadians who believe that the government party did not really try to keep its promise concerning the GST. Because citizens are increasingly interested in politics, they are more attentive, and there is greater media exposure, the chances are that the behaviours of elected officials will continue to be scrutinized very closely. Aside from exercising caution when making campaign promises, there may also be complementary institutional strategies such as reforming, and making public, tougher guidelines concerning codes of conduct for elected officials.

Do these two broad sets of findings mean that the Westminster system of representative government

is flawed and in need of fundamental reform? There are three considerations that might temper calls for radical institutional surgery. First, there is no indication that dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in this country is broad and deep. Certainly, there are important pockets of discontent that deserve attention and serious policy consideration. Young Canadians, for example, have the weakest attachments to the political community and they have the lowest confidence in political institutions. Canada’s youth are more sceptical about politicians and political parties. There are reasons to understand better why this is so and to look for strategies that will strengthen young people’s connections to the political system. But the general point is that the broad swath of the population is not deeply dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Canada. Nor is there any indication that Canadians’ attachments to democratic principles have weakened. From these standpoints the malaise has not yet reached a profoundly troubling level.

Second, the comparative context is instructive. The Canadian evidence concerning citizens’ orientations to the state is broadly consistent with, and similar to, evidence coming from citizens in other states, including other states that do not operate under Westminster-style rules. Put more sharply, declining levels of confidence in political institutions, trust in government, and distrust of political elites, are not unique features of Westminster-style political systems. Nor does it seem, that those living under Westminster rules are less satisfied with the way democracy works in Canada. Nor is there any indication that Canadians’ attachments to democratic principles have weakened. From these standpoints the malaise has not yet reached a profoundly troubling level.

The third consideration has to do with political participation. Citizens’ levels of political participation, broadly conceived, are rising not falling. Moreover, interest in politics is on the rise not declining. Rising levels of political participation and interest are signs of democratic health not sickness. What is at issue is the style of political participation: Citizens are turning less to political parties, and relying more on direct action strategies of participation. Once again, it is instructive to note that these same trends are evident in the United States and Western Europe; they are not unique to Westminster-style regimes.

These considerations do not mean that the Westminster system of representation is faultless or that institutional design does not matter. Instead, they bring into clear focus the important role that political parties play. The challenge facing political parties is how to harness, or respond to, the rising participatory instincts of citizens? One immediate possibility to consider is electoral reform. Electoral rules do have an impact on voter turnout and the indications are that if we moved to proportional representation, voter turnout might increase by as much as 3 percent. And electoral reforms undertaken in Italy, Japan, and New Zealand, in fact, were inspired by perceptions of public dissatisfaction with electoral procedures. But as one country moved toward proportional representation as a solution, another moved in the opposite direction. Moreover, there is no indication in Canada of much public dissatisfaction with our present electoral rules. The indications are, then, that the source of the malaise lies deeper than the matter of electoral procedures.

The basic structures for citizen participation in this country were set out in the nineteenth century: Citizens get to vote once every four or five years depending upon the electoral cycle. The opportunities for meaningful citizen participation at other times are limited. It seems that the rising levels of non-traditional forms of political participation are a consequence of the redistribution of political skills and greater public interest in more frequent opportunities to participate.

Canadian political parties face a challenge and some dilemmas. The challenge is for them to lead the search for ways to accommodate, and respond to, the public’s interest in more meaningful participation in the long intervals between elections. If political parties do not lead this search, take the issue
seriously, and define themselves as a part of the solution, the threat is that citizens with strong participatory instincts will continue to avoid participation through political parties.

There are at least three areas of research that deserve further investigation. The first is comparative in scope. As has already been indicated, a number of countries have experimented with institutional reforms aimed at re-engaging citizens. In some cases, such as Italy, Japan, and New Zealand, these have focused on the electoral system. In other cases, such as Germany, the reforms have allowed for greater citizen participation in local administration. What needs to be determined is which, if any, of these strategies work to satisfy citizens’ participatory demands.

The second area concerns the representation gap. The research has detected the presence of this gap. What needs now to be determined is the explanation for the gap and why it is that legislators’ priorities change the longer they hold office.

The third area concerns the status of political parties. Given the themes outlined in this article, and given the responsibility that parties have for connecting citizens to the state, it is truly striking that we know so little about what citizens expect of their political parties. Where do political parties fall short of public expectations? Why are they held in such low esteem? And what can political parties do to reconnect themselves to citizens?

NOTES

I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues on the Project on Trends Value Change for their insights and willing collaboration, and to the insightful commentary of the reviewers of the initial draft of this paper. I also thank Amanda Ng for her valuable research assistance.


2 Klingemann and Fuchs, Citizens and the State.

3 Values are referred to as core beliefs because they are more stable than either attitudes or opinions. For empirical purposes, values are typically identified as stable patterns of interconnected attitudes. For a discussion of these distinctions, see Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough, “The Concept of Values” in The Impact of Values, ed. Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 21-47.


5 Ibid., p. 13.


7 See Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1988); Klingemann and Fuchs, Citizens and the State; Abramson and Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective.


10 Typically, the increases in the number of people entering post-secondary institutions took place earlier and expanded more rapidly in Canada and the United States than in some of the more class-bound societies of Western Europe.


13Ibid., p. 147.

14Ibid.


18John R. Gibbins and Bo Reimer, “Postmodernism,” in Impact of Values, ed. van Deth and Scarbrough.


21Value Change in Global Perspective, p. 9.


23Some argue that the materialist-postmaterialist scale used by Inglehart is a problematic one on the grounds that items within the scale may be sensitive to short-term economic considerations. See, for example, Harold D. Clarke and Nittish Dutt, “Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment,” American Political Science Review 85,3 (1991): 905-20. See also Harold D. Clarke, Nittish Dutt and Jonathan Rapkin, “Conversations in Context: The (Mis)measurement of Value Change in Advanced Industrial States,” Political Behavior 19,1 (1997): 19-39. The debate is a vigorous one and some of Inglehart’s responses to the measurement issue are found in Abramson and Inglehart, Changing Values, Value Change in Global Perspective.


25For a more detailed discussion of these findings, see Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1996).


31Herman Schmitt and Sören Holmberg, “Political Parties in Decline?” in Citizens and the State, ed. Klingemann and Fuchs.


42Nevitte et al., Unsteady State.

43Norris, Critical Citizens.

44See Nevitte, Decline of Deference; and Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization.

45Norris, Critical Citizens.


52Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, Education and Democratic Citizenship.


54Ibid.


58Young, “Civic Engagement, Trust and Democracy.”

59Ibid.

60Young notes that this finding seems to contradict Roese’s finding in that high self-efficacy contributes to less confidence in government. (See Neil Roese, “Canadians’ Shrinking Trust in Government: Causes and Consequences,” paper presented at the National Trends Conference, Ottawa, November 1999.) In fact, the measures used in the two stud-
ies are not directly comparable. Roese uses a general measure of efficacy while Young employs a political measure of efficacy. As Young states, “It is a rather different thing to conclude that those who believe they can influence political outcomes have the greatest confidence in the political process, than to conclude that those who believe they can control their surroundings have greater confidence.”

61 Roese, “Canadians’ Shrinking Trust in Government.”

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid. This finding is unique to Canada; no similar trend emerges in the US.

64 Docherty, “Citizens and Legislators.”

65 See David C. Docherty, Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).

66 The clearest evidence of these period effects come from the impact of the oil crisis on people’s sense of material security. The most impressive feature of these data concerns the cross-generational impact of the period effect. See Abramson and Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective, p. 29.


69 See Blais and Dobrzynska, “Turnout in Electoral Democracies.”


72 The use of referenda is an increasingly popular option in a number of advanced industrial states and it is significant, perhaps, that it is the young and the better educated who support referenda the most.