ECON 815

Fiscal Policy in the RBC Model

Winter 2015

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RBC Model with Policy Shocks

A *policy* is defined by

$$\{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} = \{g_t, \tau_{ct}, \tau_{xt}, \tau_{kt}, \tau_{nt}, T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$$

The policy is *feasible* if it satisfies a flow budget constraint

$$g_t = \tau_{ct}c_t + \tau_{xt}x_t + \tau_{kt}r_tk_t + \tau_{nt}w_tn_t - T_t$$

Public expenditures g do not provide direct utility.

There are no technology shocks, but we would like to look at

- anticipated policy changes
- unanticipated policy shocks.

Households take prices and policy as given to maximize

$$\max_{\substack{\{c_t, n_t, x_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \\ \text{subject to} \\ (1 + \tau_{ct})c_t + (1 + \tau_{xt})x_t \leq (1 - \tau_{kt})r_tk_t + (1 - \tau_{nt})w_tn_t + T_t \\ k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + x_t \\ k_0 \text{ given}}$$

Firms have a neoclassical production function and, taking prices as given, maximize profits

$$r_t = F_k(k_t, n_t)$$
$$w_t = F_n(k_t, n_t)$$

Tax Wedges

Intratemporal distortion

$$\frac{(1-\tau_{nt})}{(1+\tau_{ct})} = \frac{u_n(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)F_n(k_t, n_t)}$$

Intertemporal distortion

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{\beta u_c(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1})} &= \\ \frac{(1 + \tau_{ct})}{(1 + \tau_{ct+1})} \left[(1 - \delta) \frac{(1 + \tau_{xt+1})}{(1 + \tau_{xt})} + F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) \frac{(1 - \tau_{kt+1})}{(1 + \tau_{xt})} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Steady State

The steady state is given by the solution (c^{SS}, n^{SS}, k^{SS}) to

$$1 = \beta \left[(1 - \delta) + \frac{(1 - \tau_k)}{(1 + \tau_x)} F_k(k^{SS}, n^{SS}) \right]$$
$$\frac{u_c(c^{SS}, 1 - n^{SS})}{u_n(c^{SS}, 1 - n^{SS})} = \frac{(1 - \tau_n)}{(1 + \tau_c)} F_n(k^{SS}, n^{SS})$$
$$g + c^{SS} + \delta k^{SS} = F(k^{SS}, n^{SS})$$

Suppose u(c, 1 - n) = u(c), i.e. labour is inelastically supplied.

- ▶ Labour taxes are lump-sum.
- Constant consumption taxes $(\tau_c \neq 0)$ are not distorting either.
- It is optimal to set $\tau_x = \tau_k = 0$ in steady state k^{SS} .

Distortions in TFP vs. Policy

What accounts for persistent differences in GDP across countries?

1) OECD vs. developing countries:

Different institutions are "barriers to riches" and lead to lower TFP.

2) Within OECD:

Labour taxes are higher in some countries leading – with high enough labor elasticity – to losses in GDP.

Variations in Policy Matter

Denote the after-tax gross return on capital by $1 + R_{t+1}$.

With inelastically supplies labour (n = 1), we get

$$u'(c_t) = \beta u'(c_{t+1})(1 + R_{t+1})$$

or

$$\log\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t}\right) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(R_{t+1} - \bar{R}\right).$$

The return R_{t+1} – and, hence, investment and consumption – is influenced by variations in tax rates.

Policy Experiments

We look at announced policy changes in period 0 that will take effect in period T.

There is a response to the announcement. The economy will react before the shock happens based on rational expectations about future policy changes.

There is a transient response after the shock to go back to the (possibly new) steady state.

We still can distinguish between permanent and temporary policy changes.

Lump-sum transfers are always available to satisfy the government's budget constraint.

- ▶ take labour to be inelastically supplied
- explicitly we vary taxes or expenditures
- ▶ implicitly we need to adjust lump-sum transfers

Experiment I – Surprise in g



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Experiment II – Announcement of increase in g



Experiment III – Announcement of increase in g



Experiment IV – Announcement of increase in τ_c



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Experiment V – Announcement of increase in τ_i



Experiment VI – Announcement of increase in τ_i



Experiment VII – Announcement of increase in τ_k

